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Abstract
The advent of digital information technology heralded the concept of information warfare. This ‘preliminary’  
stage in the 1990s really consisted of technology warfare where the networks, upon which combat relied, were  
seen   as  weapons   to   gain   ‘information   superiority’.   This  was   the   inception   of   the   technological   aspect   of  
Information  Warfare.  The   realisation  of   the  effectiveness  of  electronic  networks   to  optimize  organisational  
communication was taken up by industry, the military and terrorist groups alike. As society quickly became  
more reliant on digital networks to run its critical functions, it became apparent that this infrastructure was  
vulnerable and needed protection (as well as being a target for offensive operations).The next stage was the  
emphasis not on the technology but the information which it stored and processed. This was the ‘information’  
stage of Information Warfare (now renamed Information Operations to reflect its expanded scope). This stage  
developed   further   and   gradually   started   to   include   elements   such   as   public   relations,   and   strategic  
communications This paper examines the development of these elements and their use by terrorist groups. It  
concentrates on the contemporary manifestations of Influence Wars.
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THE ‘NEW’ ENVIRONMENT
There  is  general  agreement  that  the  ‘new’ form of  trans-national  terrorism has  change  the  complexion  of 
terrorism in the last decade.  The main trends pertaining to these trans-national groups are:
• The development of loose networks / ad hoc groups as the preferred modus operandi;
• A new attitude towards violence including suicide bombing;
• Religious based groups rather than nationalistic;
• Operations facilitated by Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) and mobile 
technologies;
• Ideas and worldviews bind them together rather than just political aspirations;
• They have less need for direct state sponsorship;
• Groups appeal to diasporas rather than just domestic audiences; and
• They have the potential to use Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons.
(Arquilla et al., 1999; Hoffman, 1998, 1999; Medhurst, 2002)
In the era of globalization, terrorism itself has been globalized. The ‘new’ terrorist organisations are loosely 
organized into groups that have some centrally espoused worldview (such as  Al Qaeda) but not necessarily a 
centralised organisational structure. There is a trend towards religious based groups rather than nationalistic, and 
these group tend to be much more lethal. In fact, all trans-national groups are religious in nature. Because of 
their religious /cultural focus they tend to get support from sympathisers in religious/ethnic communities in 
disparate countries. These are mostly first or second generation immigrants in Western nations although there is 
still a core of support in the countries of origin. At this time, the major globalised religious groups are based 
around  radical  Islam.  The  advent  since  the  early  1990s  of  global  communications  and  mass  media  has 
empowered these groups to use these media as tools for command and control, collections of funds, and also 
importantly to provide them with a worldwide audience for their views. For instance, the low cost of Internet 
web pages enables terrorist groups to publish material to a global audience. In fact, in the early 1990s, terrorist 
groups of all kinds were the first to fully exploit this developing medium. The evolution of the use of these 
technologies developed in tandem with their use by Western government and militaries.
INFORMATION TERRORISM
The concept of  information terrorism has its origins in the ideas that surrounded information warfare. Libicki 
(1995) first described the elements of information warfare to be seven subtypes of  warfare:  Command and 
Control, Intelligence Based, Hacker, Electronic, Psychological, Cyber and Economic based information warfare. 
Information warfare in its  early stages was very much focused on exploiting the new technologies to gain 
advantage. Whilst there was an element of psychological warfare, it was predominantly about command and 
control and disruption of enemy systems. As the potential of these technologies to influence both friend and foe 
was realised, there was a renewed focus on this aspect. As the wars of the late 1990s’ became more politicised, 
the advantage of information dominance (or information superiority), began to be recognised and were used in 
both times of  ‘peace’ and ‘war’ –  as the distinction between these two states faded. The term Information 
Operations  was  coined  to  superseded  the  more  dramatic  information  warfare  (which  is  now  a  sub-set  of 
information operations to be used in times of open conflict).   
In this paper Information terrorism is defined as the practice of information operations by those deemed to be 
terrorists. Figure 1 illustrates some of the elements of information operations/ information terrorism.
Figure 1: Examples of the Elements of Information Operations/Terrorism
It  can be seen from Figure 1 that  information terrorism consists  of  a  variety of  components ranging from 
technology  (instrumentally)  based  approaches  to  human  (psychologically)  based  activities.  In  a  way,  this 
describes the development of the emphasis of information operations over the last two decades. It has both 
defensive  and  offensive  modes.  This  paper  concentrates  on  the  human/psychologically  oriented  offensive 
strategies  used  by  terrorist  groups.   Information  Operations  (IO)  has  developed  into  a  truly 
Information/Knowledge Age phenomenon, as Hall (2003, p.97) illustrates:
Information operations of the future will rely on both a philosophy and a set of tools. The philosophy  
of IO acknowledges the emergence and importance of knowledge war and its direct connection to  
knowledge-based strategies and knowledge-based operations. The philosophy acknowledges the pre-
eminence of information and knowledge as they contribute to effective decision making, as well as the  
importance of thinking planning and perceptions from two points of view: ours and the adversary’s.  
The IO suite of tools will be used to attack the thinking, planning, decision-making processes, the  
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mechanical  turning of  data into information and information into knowledge,  and the machinery 
supporting the decision making cycles of our adversaries.
Whilst this is written from a conventional military perspective, it captures the essence of the use of information 
operations by terrorists and government agencies in conflict with them.
Table 1 outlines some of the components of contemporary information terrorism. Whilst there are a number of 
Command and Control and Cyber war elements, it is the Influence functions components that dominate.
Table 1:  Contemporary factors influencing Information Terrorism
CYBERWAR FUNCTIONS:
• Attack technology by using:
 Logic bombs, viruses, worms, spy-ware, flooding, DOS attacks, Web defacement
• Defend technology by using:
 Virus checkers, network tools, network forensics, standards, backups, intrusion detection 
systems, honeypots, training 
ORGANISATIONAL (COMMAND AND CONTROL) FUNCTIONS:
• Coordinating activities:
 Network centric organisations using such elements as the Web, SMS, coordinated sensors,  
and streaming video.
• Bind supporters and spread message:
 Use the Web and the mass media to promote cause to a global audience. Use the Web to 
collect monies.
MIND/INFLUENCE FUNCTIONS:
• Contemporary audience
 Globalized reach of communications has given the ability to reach anyone/anywhere.
• Strategic communications
 Influence campaigns are now an integral part of national and terrorist strategy.  Each has 
its own targeted constituency in the globalized information environment.
• Terrorism is psychological warfare
 Violence as communication.
 Goals cannot be obtained by violence alone.
 Victims must be enlisted to gain objectives.
 Persistent campaign with the target population increasingly perceiving (irrationally?)  
risk.
 Boost its supporters, frighten it opponents. 
 Seek to undermine beliefs in the collective values of society.
 Terrorists uses the victims’ imagination against themselves
• Technology of the despised West is used against it
 Even the Taliban, who are averse to technology, had a Web site.
 Web and other technologies such as SMS are more difficult to censor.
 Terrorists’ Web sites are better suited to their target audiences than ‘official’ sites.
 Effective use of video imagery on Web and, subsequently, the mass media.
• Technology has decreased the West’s dominance of mass communication.
 The terrorists’ strategy is recognises the importance of having information/influence 
practices.
 The importance of the media is shown by the increase in violent targeting of broadcasters 
by Western militaries and governments 
 Censorship of the Web is increasing although terrorists seem to be able to combat this
It is the Mind/Influence functions that will be further discussed below.
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TERRORIST GROUPS
Terrorism can predominantly be considered as asymmetric warfare fought mostly as psychological warfare. 
Psychological warfare is a term used to describe the suite of actions that consists of violence or the threat of 
violence  plus  some  form of  psychological  operations.  Psychological  operations  consist  of  actions  such  as 
disinformation,  deception,  propaganda,  and  showing  force  (Goldstein  and  Jacobowitz,  1996).  In  its  most 
successful form, it can create a victory without the need to use force.  Traditionally, it has been considered 
another way of making the enemy surrender. However, its tactics can be used to both destroy the ‘will’ of the 
enemy,  and  boost  the  ‘will’ of  supporters.  In  contemporary  terrorist  actions  the  actors  are  the  terrorists 
themselves, their supporters, those that are neutral, plus governments and global publics. Terrorists know that 
they cannot win using violence alone as, militarily, they are in a weaker position.
The violent components of terrorist actions are symbolic and designed to send a (political) message (Tuman, 
2003).  In a sense,  if  there was no message to be understood by the targeted audience then such things as 
bombings  and  shootings  would  have  no  objective  except  violence  itself.  Although  certain  religious  based 
terrorist groups do seem to want to maximise body counts (Medhurst, 2002), there is still an underlying political 
message. Tuman (2003, pp. 46-48) states that symbolic acts of violence should be analysed using the following 
factors: the intent of the communication, the context of the communication, and the relativity of the symbolic 
message. Each of these acts of violence has primary, secondary, and tertiary targets or audiences. For instance 
the attacks on September 11th, 2001 on New York and Washington had the immediate target of the victims of the 
violence, secondary targets such as the American government and public and the global Islamic population, and 
tertiary audiences in Europe and other countries. The symbolism of the attacks and their targets were numerous; 
they were attacks on the US military (the Pentagon), its government (the failed attempts on the Whitehouse 
/Capitol), and the capitalist economic/trading systems (the World Trade Centre). Also, it could be considered an 
attack on the invulnerability of the American ‘homeland’, and modernity (represented by the architecture of the 
World Trade Centre).
However, these attacks are the determinants of whether a group is considered to be a terrorist group or not: 
much  of  the  influence  effort  goes  around  these  events.  The  acts  of  violence  by  themselves  are  almost 
meaningless  without  messages  and  context.  Whilst  the  violence  is  a  form  of  messaging,  the  underlying 
political/religious objectives of these acts need to be communicated. Hence, each message must have a context, 
and  intent,  and  a  targeted  audience.  The  latter  might  involves  varies  degrees  of  impact  depending  on  the 
audience targeted. 
Also,  there  is  a  need for  the terrorists  to  target  various  stages of  influence in  their  desired audiences.  For 
instance, radical Islamists desire long term goals and, as such, temporary disturbances that will be forgotten in a 
short period might be tactically beneficial to them but must be a part of a longer term strategic plan. Figure 2 
explains the types of influence, their relative gestation period and their outcomes.
Figure 2: Elements of Strategic Influence /Psychological Operations
The short term tactics of enticement and coercion are really a classic psychological warfare method. 
Compliance might be obtained but belief systems are not altered. So whilst intimidation might provide 
short  term changes in behaviour,  the underlying political  message has not  necessarily been accepted 
by the target audience. The next step to obtain conformity in the target audience is more difficult to 
achieve. Inducements such as peer pressure, and the credibility of the message and presenter assist in 
bringing about  this  medium term goal  (Cragin and Gerwehr, 2005, pp.17-19).  For terrorist  groups,  this 
outcome can realised in areas where the message has some context. For instance, for Islamic terrorist 
groups, in regions with a high proportion of Muslims. Once the social context has been controlled, the 
next  long  term  step  is  to  progress  to  the  conversion  stage  where  the  audience  is  more  or  less 
controlled  by  the  influencer.  Religious  schools  or  tightly  controlled  states  produce  this  long  term 
outcome, and fewer inducements have to be given relative to the changes in the other two stages.
The campaign by  Al Qaeda can be seen in this light.  The first  stage was highlighted by spectacular 
violent events that brought short term visibility, and targeted the Muslim  ummah.  This stage showed 
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the West being coerced and sent out the message that the oppression of Muslim by the West was being 
fought  by  Al  Qaeda.  Reactions  by  the  West  and  the  social  consequences  that  this  caused  in  Iraq, 
Afghanistan,  Palestine,  and  other  areas  such  a  Chechnya created a  social  and political  environment 
that  was conducive to conversion,  or  partial  conversion,  of  Muslims to  Al Qaeda’s cause.  In certain 
areas, this process has radicalised portions of the Islamic population and encouraged the development 
of radical Islamic schools or maddrasses.
Persuasive  communication  must  go  through  a  series  of  steps  before  it  is  transformed  into  action. 
Firstly,  the audience must be exposed to the message. In terms of  successful terrorist  groups,  this is 
usually achieved by some spectacular act of violence that it relayed through the mass media and then 
followed up by Web page entries.  Sometimes the event is transmitted through the Web first and then 
picked up by the media, for instance, beheadings of hostages in the 2002 - 2005 period. The message 
must then receive attention by the audience: that is, it must be noticed by the target audience and not 
lost in the ‘noise’ of other messages. The audience must then comprehend the message so it should be 
presented  in  a  way  that  is  understandable  to  that  audience.  The  audience  must  then  accept  the 
message,  which  means  that  it  must  fit  into  their  worldviews.  The  message  should  have  a  length  of 
retention that  enables it  to  be translated from the  cognitive  domain into behavioural  change (Cragin 
and Gerwehr, 2005). Each of these stages needs to be successful to obtain the three outcomes listed in 
Figure 2.  The success of  the radical  Islamists in the last  decade is  that  they have achieved all  three 
stages in some form or another, by a concerted information operations effort that has involved targeted 
violence that has symbolic significance to both friend and foe They have not only managed to create a 
global movement from a small number of people, but to convert a significant number of others to their 
cause.
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND INFLUENCE 
The development of the Internet,  mobile technologies,  and global communications has enabled many 
terrorist groups to access cheap means to send their  messages to the world.  Whilst  terrorists use the 
Internet  for  instrumental  purposes  such  as  fundraising  and  command  and  control,  there  is  now  the 
capability to perform psychological and propaganda operations on a scale not available until the mid-
1990s. As Weinman (2004, 2006) states; the Internet offers, easy access, anonymity, a global audience, 
low cost presence, a relatively uncensored environment, an ability to by-pass the formal mass media, 
and a presentation capability from multimedia products to achieve a strong impact.  
Almost all terrorist organisations have a Web presence – even the technologically averse Taliban. The 
sites promote their cause in the best light as any other government or commercial site would do.  Each 
is designed to present to and, sometimes mobilise,  current and potential supporters as well as public 
opinion their view of the world and to promote their agenda.
Other  innovations  such  as  ‘Captology’ (Fogg,  2003)  will  enable  all  Web  users  to  exploit  the  influencing 
potential of Web sites and their associated multimedia content. (Captology is an acronym based on the phrase 
computers  and  persuasive  technologies).  It  aims  to  use  design  to  further  behaviour  and  attitude  change, 
compliance motivation, and changes in worldview (ibid,  p.5) .Whilst this is still at an early stage, this new 
design  emphasis  might  have  high  potential  to  government,  industry  and  terrorist  organisations.  Whilst 
Captology is limited to conventional computers presentation, other technologies such as mobile devices will 
become vulnerable to influence campaigns. 
CONCLUSION
Information terrorism has many components from cyber-terrorism (or the threat of cyber-terrorism –  cyber-
fear), to command and control to psychological operations. This paper has outlined the function of influence in 
this mix. Of course, each component is an integral part of the other. For instance, the use of cyber-fear could be 
used in an influence campaign as a  coercive  tool.  It  is  interesting to  observe  that  the skills  needed to  run 
effective public relations campaigns in ‘conventional’ organisations has been exploited to the full by terrorist 
related groups to the point that it could be argued that they can control the mass media’s agenda. 
As the concept of information operations has matured, there has been increasing emphasis on the persuasive and 
influential components of information operations and less on the technological based concept of network wars. 
Both are still important but the 21st century has seen the concept of a ‘mind war’ come to the fore. Of course, 
this is nothing new as history is littered with examples of mind wars, for instance the French Wars of religion in 
the sixteenth century, which used the printing press as its tool, or the Cold War of the twentieth century, which 
used radio and television as its tools to promulgate ideas. 
However,  the  ability  to  communicate  globally  and  the  development  of  psychological  methods  to  coerce, 
influence or persuade has potentially increased their effectiveness. Terrorists know this and their aim is to sell 
their ideas to achieve power or other goals. Whilst the conflict is asymmetric, with the military might in favour 
of the terrorists’ enemies, then psychological warfare is their most effective option.
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